In addition to the high levels of corruption, nepotism, ethnic tension, organized crime and social dissatisfaction, Kosovo continues to face one of the most complex obstacles that exist on the international stage, a kind of political quagmire that keeps the old Serbian province trapped in a tunnel with very few signs of light: the absence of universal recognition, which plunges the youngest country in Europe into the international isolation it suffers.
Eleven years after Kosovo’s Assembly met in Pristina and decided to declare its independence unilaterally, more than half of the states with a seat in the United Nations (UN) have recognized its independence from Serbia. However, the list of non-recognizers —including Russia, China, Mexico, India, Brazil and Spain— is long and includes countries with enormous leverage in the new geopolitical landscape.
The problem of non-recognition, which in principle might seem to be a trivial matter, is of utmost importance. It has an impact not only on Kosovo’s foreign policy, but also on its internal affairs. The Serbo-Russian friendship, as well as Russia and China’s veto power in the Security Council, protects Serbian interests and continues to block Kosovo’s accession to the UN, despite the United States’ (US) staunch defence of Kosovo’s independence. The delay in acceding to the European Union (EU), however, is what has the greatest consequences for Kosovo’s weak economy and the freedom of movement of its citizens, who still need to apply for a visa to travel freely in the EU.
Although twenty-three EU member states have recognized Kosovo’s independence, the absence of recognition by the remaining five —Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and Spain— continues to block Kosovo’s accession to the European club. This fact explains, inter alia, why in the summer of 2019, the presidents of Kosovo and Serbia, Hashim Thaçi and Aleksandar Vučić, respectively, suggested a territorial exchange between the two states as a compromise. This hypothetical plan would imply the recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state by Serbia and would close the chapter of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
Without a binding agreement for the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo —which until now has seemed very distant— it will be very difficult for the five EU non-recognizers to change their position, and thus, Kosovo’s integration into the EU will remain at a stalemate. The Kosovar population will be left to suffer the consequences of this stalemate, while the political elite will continue to entrench itself in power.
Recognition by the five EU non-recognizers is indispensable, as it will give a breath of fresh air to the Kosovar population and will consolidate an existing reality: that Kosovo, despite its deficient institutions, nonetheless functions as a state, even if it is only partially recognized at the global level. Furthermore, it is very difficult to imagine Kosovo being ruled by the Serbian Government, which viciously eroded the rights of ethnic Albanians during the 1990s.
Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and, obviously, Spain should start understanding the Kosovo case in terms of foreign policy, instead of national politics. The situation faced by Albanians in the former Serbian province at the end of the 20th century is hardly comparable to the experience lived by Turkish Cypriots, Catalans or Basques in the last ten years. Contrary to what these states have intended, the decision not to recognize Kosovo by reference to problems of an internal nature has opened a small window of opportunity to draw an analogy between the two situations, despite it being an absurd and incomprehensible one.
The case of Spain is the one that has resonated most in recent years, especially due to the escalation of the independence movement in Catalonia and the attempt of the movement’s leaders to draw an analogy between the latter and Kosovo. The various Spanish governments were unsuccessful with their chosen strategy; instead of recognizing Kosovo and demonstrating once and for all that there is no room for comparison between the two cases, they have deepened —without intending to— the analogy between their independence movements and Kosovo. This led to a deterioration of already poor diplomatic relations with Kosovo, when the Catalan quest for independence was at its highest peak. This included the reiteration that Kosovo’s independence is a clear breach of international law, despite the 2010 International Court of Justice ruling that denied such a violation.
The recognition of Kosovo by Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and Spain is necessary. It would not only have a positive impact on the future of Kosovo’s people, but also on the national politics of the five EU-recognizers. This decision would accelerate Kosovo's path to the EU and would send a clear message to the respective nationalist groups of the five EU states: any analogy between Kosovo and the territorial aspirations of other regions, including Catalonia, is unsustainable.
Kosovo, battling eleven years for its recognition
Originally published in Spanish by the magazine Atalayar.
In addition to the high levels of corruption, nepotism, ethnic tension, organized crime and social dissatisfaction, Kosovo continues to face one of the most complex obstacles that exist on the international stage, a kind of political quagmire that keeps the old Serbian province trapped in a tunnel with very few signs of light: the absence of universal recognition, which plunges the youngest country in Europe into the international isolation it suffers.
Eleven years after Kosovo’s Assembly met in Pristina and decided to declare its independence unilaterally, more than half of the states with a seat in the United Nations (UN) have recognized its independence from Serbia. However, the list of non-recognizers —including Russia, China, Mexico, India, Brazil and Spain— is long and includes countries with enormous leverage in the new geopolitical landscape.
The problem of non-recognition, which in principle might seem to be a trivial matter, is of utmost importance. It has an impact not only on Kosovo’s foreign policy, but also on its internal affairs. The Serbo-Russian friendship, as well as Russia and China’s veto power in the Security Council, protects Serbian interests and continues to block Kosovo’s accession to the UN, despite the United States’ (US) staunch defence of Kosovo’s independence. The delay in acceding to the European Union (EU), however, is what has the greatest consequences for Kosovo’s weak economy and the freedom of movement of its citizens, who still need to apply for a visa to travel freely in the EU.
Although twenty-three EU member states have recognized Kosovo’s independence, the absence of recognition by the remaining five —Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and Spain— continues to block Kosovo’s accession to the European club. This fact explains, inter alia, why in the summer of 2019, the presidents of Kosovo and Serbia, Hashim Thaçi and Aleksandar Vučić, respectively, suggested a territorial exchange between the two states as a compromise. This hypothetical plan would imply the recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state by Serbia and would close the chapter of the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
Without a binding agreement for the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo —which until now has seemed very distant— it will be very difficult for the five EU non-recognizers to change their position, and thus, Kosovo’s integration into the EU will remain at a stalemate. The Kosovar population will be left to suffer the consequences of this stalemate, while the political elite will continue to entrench itself in power.
Recognition by the five EU non-recognizers is indispensable, as it will give a breath of fresh air to the Kosovar population and will consolidate an existing reality: that Kosovo, despite its deficient institutions, nonetheless functions as a state, even if it is only partially recognized at the global level. Furthermore, it is very difficult to imagine Kosovo being ruled by the Serbian Government, which viciously eroded the rights of ethnic Albanians during the 1990s.
Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and, obviously, Spain should start understanding the Kosovo case in terms of foreign policy, instead of national politics. The situation faced by Albanians in the former Serbian province at the end of the 20th century is hardly comparable to the experience lived by Turkish Cypriots, Catalans or Basques in the last ten years. Contrary to what these states have intended, the decision not to recognize Kosovo by reference to problems of an internal nature has opened a small window of opportunity to draw an analogy between the two situations, despite it being an absurd and incomprehensible one.
The case of Spain is the one that has resonated most in recent years, especially due to the escalation of the independence movement in Catalonia and the attempt of the movement’s leaders to draw an analogy between the latter and Kosovo. The various Spanish governments were unsuccessful with their chosen strategy; instead of recognizing Kosovo and demonstrating once and for all that there is no room for comparison between the two cases, they have deepened —without intending to— the analogy between their independence movements and Kosovo. This led to a deterioration of already poor diplomatic relations with Kosovo, when the Catalan quest for independence was at its highest peak. This included the reiteration that Kosovo’s independence is a clear breach of international law, despite the 2010 International Court of Justice ruling that denied such a violation.
The recognition of Kosovo by Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and Spain is necessary. It would not only have a positive impact on the future of Kosovo’s people, but also on the national politics of the five EU-recognizers. This decision would accelerate Kosovo's path to the EU and would send a clear message to the respective nationalist groups of the five EU states: any analogy between Kosovo and the territorial aspirations of other regions, including Catalonia, is unsustainable.