The Czech Republic will take over the EU Presidency in July with the declared ambition to revive the stalled EU enlargement of the Western Balkans. A breakthrough is unlikely.
Czech policy towards the Western Balkans is expected to go through the wringer over the coming year.
The Czech Republic will take over the Presidency of the Council of the EU from July. The previous government of Andrej Babis already declared the Western Balkans and its European integration to be among the top foreign policy priorities of the Czech EU Presidency agenda. Thus, the new government that took over after the October 2021 election will find itself in a tricky position from which it will inescapably have to deal not only with the stalled EU enlargement process currently blocked by the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, but also with the burning regional issues, including the protracted institutional crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, escalating tensions in Montenegro and the deadlocked dispute between Kosovo and Serbia.
Western Balkans as an elusive priority
European integration of the Western Balkans has been a constant priority of Czech foreign policy over the last decade and a half since the country joined the EU. Czech diplomacy has been supportive of the European ambitions of the Western Balkan states both bilaterally and through multilateral channels, including the Visegrad Group (V4).
None of the governments have, however, achieved a significant footprint in the process. Czech policymakers have been largely reluctant to take clear positions over the problematic issues of the region and the regional developments mostly remain on the margins of their agenda. The political elite never truly considered the Western Balkans a top priority of foreign policy, which has been dominated by more crucial issues related to the country’s geopolitical orientation within the Euro-Atlantic space and its relations with Russia. In this context, the new government’s declared support for the Western Balkans’ EU integration brings nothing new to the Czech foreign policy discourse.
The new administration largely inherited the rhetorical commitment to the Western Balkan agenda from the previous government, which announced the “Balkan priority” for the Czech EU Presidency in mid-2021. However, the domestic political context regarding the EU has substantially changed since then, as the new government takes office unburdened by the scandals of the previous administration and can thus negotiate from a better position.
Babiš, the billionaire prime minister of the previous government, had problematic relations with European institutions due to his conflict of interests and misuse of EU funds. At the EU level, his government frequently led an aggressively nationalist policy on sensitive issues such as migration, and sought allies among other regional populist leaders, including Viktor Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovenia’s Janez Janša.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was controlled by the Social Democrats during the previous government, the junior coalition partner to Babiš’s populist ANO movement. Former pro-European minister Tomáš Petříček, who persistently balanced the nationalist positions of Babiš and President Milos Zeman, was sacked in 2021 and replaced by Jakub Kulhánek, who was perceived as more loyal to President Zeman.
Interestingly, it was Kulhánek who publicly proclaimed that the Czech Republic should organise an EU-WB summit as one of the main outcomes of its EU Presidency, with the very ambitious but hardly achievable goal: to set the EU accession date for Serbia, Albania or North Macedonia.
The former government pursued an active bilateral policy in the Western Balkans mainly driven by economic diplomacy and had Serbia as its special focus. During 2021, there was a spike in mutual visits on the top political level when Babiš visited Belgrade in February, and Serbian President Vučić came to Prague several months later.
A special regional focus on Serbia well suited the pro-Serbian agenda of President Zeman, who used Vučić’s visit to apologise for Czech participation in the 1999 NATO intervention, ironically approved by Zeman as prime minister back then. Meanwhile, both Kulhánek and Babiš rhetorically stuck to the support of European ambitions of the region as a whole, while admitting stalemate in the accession process.
Officially, the new Czech coalition government will follow the pro-active regional agenda outlined by the previous administration. It reaffirmed the Western Balkan priority of the EU Presidency and is also considering the option of inviting regional leaders to a top-level EU summit in Prague. For now, though, it is not yet clear to what extent the declared support truly reflects actual intentions, ambitions and capabilities of the new administration, especially given the lack of time for preparations of the Presidency.
Officials of the new government have accused Babiš’s government of under-prioritising the Presidency, and both policymakers and experts now admit that Czech ambitions extend to not failing and organising a formally smooth Presidency rather than achieving significant progress in any particular area. The agenda-setting of the previous government has positioned the Czech Republic as an active player in the Western Balkans during the 2022 Presidency. However, it remains to be seen to what extent and in which form this ambition will be realised by the new administration.
However, it is still unclear whether the new Czech government – a centre-right coalition of five parties led by university professor Petr Fiala – will be truly devoted to and even equipped to deal with these challenging tasks, and what position it will take in the actual negotiations on these complex regional issues.
Internal discord in European policy
Even if the new Czech representation develops the capacity to actively influence the top political debate at the EU level, it could easily fall victim to an internal rift stemming from the complex coalition arrangements of the new government.
Fiala’s coalition consists of representatives of five ideologically diverse parties whose views on European politics vary significantly. The prime minister comes from the strongest conservative ODS party, while two junior coalition partners control the key foreign policy ministries: the liberal Pirate Party the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the centre-right STAN movement the newly established Ministry for European Affairs.
While Fiala, a scholar and professor of European Politics, and his party have a moderately Euro-sceptic profile over the long term, the Pirates and STAN, together with the other two minor coalition partners, hold openly pro-EU positions. Illustrative of the ideological heterogeneity is the fact that deputies from these parties in the European Parliament are affiliated to opposing political groups. MEPs of the strongest, ODS, belong to the Eurosceptic ECR group dominated by the troublesome Polish ruling Law and Justice party. MEPs of three smaller coalition parties are in the conservative yet pro-European EPP group, while Pirate deputies are members of the Green group.
It is, for now, unclear how the distribution of powers between the three offices responsible for European policy controlled by different parties will play out and who will be setting and driving the political agenda of the EU Presidency. Nevertheless, it is evident that any more ambitious attempt in European policy, including the Western Balkan agenda, will first need to be debated at the level of the ruling coalition.
To complicate the decision-making process further, President Zeman, whose foreign policy agenda is largely in contradiction with the program of the new government, might try to exploit his institutionally limited but unofficially influential powers to counter the pro-Western course of the executive. With regards to the Western Balkan agenda, Zeman is renowned for his assertive pro-Serbian position over the Kosovo issue, which could motivate him to intervene in the policymaking process. It is probable that he will push Vučić’s Serbia and its regional interests higher in the agenda while dragging down Serbia’s regional rivals.
Externally limited room to manoeuvre
The current stage of the Europeanisation process across the Western Balkans is probably best characterised as an impasse and mutual disillusionment. On the Balkan side, the local political elites have not implemented the required political reforms nor managed their internal and mutual conflicts over the last two decades. On the EU side, the member states have been unable to find a common stance over the future course and speed of the process leading to the eventual accession promised to the region back in 2003.
The protracted stagnation has recreated a geopolitical vacuum in the EU’s backyard that has been filled by interest-driven politics of other external actors who are offering alternative geopolitical and economic visions to the pragmatic political leaders across the region. In the context of the longstanding deadlock of the EU enlargement to the region, any significant breakthrough in the Western Balkans’ EU integration process can hardly be expected within the six-month EU Presidency term.
Because of the long-term dynamics of European politics, the room for manoeuvre of the Czech EU Presidency within the Western Balkan agenda will be limited. As long as the Czech Republic is perceived as a weak player at the EU level, the new government will first need to work on solidifying its negotiating position. Besides that, it should also carefully follow the path marked by the preceding French EU Presidency, whose actual intentions regarding the Western Balkans remain unclear for now.
What can Czech politicians really do?
Overall, the Czech EU Presidency will have to deal with the Western Balkan agenda from a difficult position weakened by both domestic and international political limits. However, limited capabilities and opportunities should not prevent the Czech government from pursuing a pro-active and constructive policy towards the region.
New political representation, unburdened by controversies of the previous government, has a chance to convince European partners that the Czech Republic can act as a responsible actor in European politics, including the foreign policy area. Its EU Presidency in 2022 will not only be the best opportunity to prove this new course, but also a test of the credibility and capacities of the Fiala government.
The Czech government should take the unique opportunity provided by the EU Presidency and stick to the ambition to keep the region high on the agenda, regardless of the actual impact on the overall process of EU enlargement. Even more importantly, Czech political representatives, together with diplomats and bureaucrats, should be prepared and equipped to take a lead in the mediation of potential imminent crises that may well erupt in the region during its six-month term in the second half of 2022.
It is probable that the constitutional crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina will further intensify before or during the general elections scheduled for October, which could have destabilising effects on the wider region. The deadlocked dispute between Kosovo and Serbia will certainly remain an important latent source of regional instability, and any escalation will unavoidably have to be addressed at the EU level. The protracted domestic political crisis in Montenegro is another hot issue with wide-ranging implications for the region.
From the European perspective, it is questionable whether the bilateral dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia will be resolved anytime soon, nor whether the EU itself can even find internal agreement on the opening of accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia. If no progress is achieved during the French EU Presidency in that regard, the tough negotiations might be postponed to the Czech term.
All the above-listed burning regional issues, possibly amplified by other unexpected developments, will require a firm political response at the EU level to prevent further destabilisation of the Western Balkans. If it wants to meet the expectations already set for its EU Presidency mandate, Czech political representation will have to make full use of the limited room for manoeuvre and actively engage in regional politics, while preventing its internal divisions from interfering.
Correction: This is a corrected version of the article. In the original it said that Serbian President Vučić and then-prime minister Dačić came to Prague, but at the time Dačić was chairman of the National Assembly.
Can the Czech EU presidency bring Western Balkans accession any closer?
This article was originally published by Balkan Insight.
The Czech Republic will take over the EU Presidency in July with the declared ambition to revive the stalled EU enlargement of the Western Balkans. A breakthrough is unlikely.
Czech policy towards the Western Balkans is expected to go through the wringer over the coming year.
The Czech Republic will take over the Presidency of the Council of the EU from July. The previous government of Andrej Babis already declared the Western Balkans and its European integration to be among the top foreign policy priorities of the Czech EU Presidency agenda. Thus, the new government that took over after the October 2021 election will find itself in a tricky position from which it will inescapably have to deal not only with the stalled EU enlargement process currently blocked by the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, but also with the burning regional issues, including the protracted institutional crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, escalating tensions in Montenegro and the deadlocked dispute between Kosovo and Serbia.
Western Balkans as an elusive priority
European integration of the Western Balkans has been a constant priority of Czech foreign policy over the last decade and a half since the country joined the EU. Czech diplomacy has been supportive of the European ambitions of the Western Balkan states both bilaterally and through multilateral channels, including the Visegrad Group (V4).
None of the governments have, however, achieved a significant footprint in the process. Czech policymakers have been largely reluctant to take clear positions over the problematic issues of the region and the regional developments mostly remain on the margins of their agenda. The political elite never truly considered the Western Balkans a top priority of foreign policy, which has been dominated by more crucial issues related to the country’s geopolitical orientation within the Euro-Atlantic space and its relations with Russia. In this context, the new government’s declared support for the Western Balkans’ EU integration brings nothing new to the Czech foreign policy discourse.
The new administration largely inherited the rhetorical commitment to the Western Balkan agenda from the previous government, which announced the “Balkan priority” for the Czech EU Presidency in mid-2021. However, the domestic political context regarding the EU has substantially changed since then, as the new government takes office unburdened by the scandals of the previous administration and can thus negotiate from a better position.
Babiš, the billionaire prime minister of the previous government, had problematic relations with European institutions due to his conflict of interests and misuse of EU funds. At the EU level, his government frequently led an aggressively nationalist policy on sensitive issues such as migration, and sought allies among other regional populist leaders, including Viktor Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovenia’s Janez Janša.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was controlled by the Social Democrats during the previous government, the junior coalition partner to Babiš’s populist ANO movement. Former pro-European minister Tomáš Petříček, who persistently balanced the nationalist positions of Babiš and President Milos Zeman, was sacked in 2021 and replaced by Jakub Kulhánek, who was perceived as more loyal to President Zeman.
Interestingly, it was Kulhánek who publicly proclaimed that the Czech Republic should organise an EU-WB summit as one of the main outcomes of its EU Presidency, with the very ambitious but hardly achievable goal: to set the EU accession date for Serbia, Albania or North Macedonia.
The former government pursued an active bilateral policy in the Western Balkans mainly driven by economic diplomacy and had Serbia as its special focus. During 2021, there was a spike in mutual visits on the top political level when Babiš visited Belgrade in February, and Serbian President Vučić came to Prague several months later.
A special regional focus on Serbia well suited the pro-Serbian agenda of President Zeman, who used Vučić’s visit to apologise for Czech participation in the 1999 NATO intervention, ironically approved by Zeman as prime minister back then. Meanwhile, both Kulhánek and Babiš rhetorically stuck to the support of European ambitions of the region as a whole, while admitting stalemate in the accession process.
Officially, the new Czech coalition government will follow the pro-active regional agenda outlined by the previous administration. It reaffirmed the Western Balkan priority of the EU Presidency and is also considering the option of inviting regional leaders to a top-level EU summit in Prague. For now, though, it is not yet clear to what extent the declared support truly reflects actual intentions, ambitions and capabilities of the new administration, especially given the lack of time for preparations of the Presidency.
Officials of the new government have accused Babiš’s government of under-prioritising the Presidency, and both policymakers and experts now admit that Czech ambitions extend to not failing and organising a formally smooth Presidency rather than achieving significant progress in any particular area. The agenda-setting of the previous government has positioned the Czech Republic as an active player in the Western Balkans during the 2022 Presidency. However, it remains to be seen to what extent and in which form this ambition will be realised by the new administration.
However, it is still unclear whether the new Czech government – a centre-right coalition of five parties led by university professor Petr Fiala – will be truly devoted to and even equipped to deal with these challenging tasks, and what position it will take in the actual negotiations on these complex regional issues.
Internal discord in European policy
Even if the new Czech representation develops the capacity to actively influence the top political debate at the EU level, it could easily fall victim to an internal rift stemming from the complex coalition arrangements of the new government.
Fiala’s coalition consists of representatives of five ideologically diverse parties whose views on European politics vary significantly. The prime minister comes from the strongest conservative ODS party, while two junior coalition partners control the key foreign policy ministries: the liberal Pirate Party the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the centre-right STAN movement the newly established Ministry for European Affairs.
While Fiala, a scholar and professor of European Politics, and his party have a moderately Euro-sceptic profile over the long term, the Pirates and STAN, together with the other two minor coalition partners, hold openly pro-EU positions. Illustrative of the ideological heterogeneity is the fact that deputies from these parties in the European Parliament are affiliated to opposing political groups. MEPs of the strongest, ODS, belong to the Eurosceptic ECR group dominated by the troublesome Polish ruling Law and Justice party. MEPs of three smaller coalition parties are in the conservative yet pro-European EPP group, while Pirate deputies are members of the Green group.
It is, for now, unclear how the distribution of powers between the three offices responsible for European policy controlled by different parties will play out and who will be setting and driving the political agenda of the EU Presidency. Nevertheless, it is evident that any more ambitious attempt in European policy, including the Western Balkan agenda, will first need to be debated at the level of the ruling coalition.
To complicate the decision-making process further, President Zeman, whose foreign policy agenda is largely in contradiction with the program of the new government, might try to exploit his institutionally limited but unofficially influential powers to counter the pro-Western course of the executive. With regards to the Western Balkan agenda, Zeman is renowned for his assertive pro-Serbian position over the Kosovo issue, which could motivate him to intervene in the policymaking process. It is probable that he will push Vučić’s Serbia and its regional interests higher in the agenda while dragging down Serbia’s regional rivals.
Externally limited room to manoeuvre
The current stage of the Europeanisation process across the Western Balkans is probably best characterised as an impasse and mutual disillusionment. On the Balkan side, the local political elites have not implemented the required political reforms nor managed their internal and mutual conflicts over the last two decades. On the EU side, the member states have been unable to find a common stance over the future course and speed of the process leading to the eventual accession promised to the region back in 2003.
The protracted stagnation has recreated a geopolitical vacuum in the EU’s backyard that has been filled by interest-driven politics of other external actors who are offering alternative geopolitical and economic visions to the pragmatic political leaders across the region. In the context of the longstanding deadlock of the EU enlargement to the region, any significant breakthrough in the Western Balkans’ EU integration process can hardly be expected within the six-month EU Presidency term.
Because of the long-term dynamics of European politics, the room for manoeuvre of the Czech EU Presidency within the Western Balkan agenda will be limited. As long as the Czech Republic is perceived as a weak player at the EU level, the new government will first need to work on solidifying its negotiating position. Besides that, it should also carefully follow the path marked by the preceding French EU Presidency, whose actual intentions regarding the Western Balkans remain unclear for now.
What can Czech politicians really do?
Overall, the Czech EU Presidency will have to deal with the Western Balkan agenda from a difficult position weakened by both domestic and international political limits. However, limited capabilities and opportunities should not prevent the Czech government from pursuing a pro-active and constructive policy towards the region.
New political representation, unburdened by controversies of the previous government, has a chance to convince European partners that the Czech Republic can act as a responsible actor in European politics, including the foreign policy area. Its EU Presidency in 2022 will not only be the best opportunity to prove this new course, but also a test of the credibility and capacities of the Fiala government.
The Czech government should take the unique opportunity provided by the EU Presidency and stick to the ambition to keep the region high on the agenda, regardless of the actual impact on the overall process of EU enlargement. Even more importantly, Czech political representatives, together with diplomats and bureaucrats, should be prepared and equipped to take a lead in the mediation of potential imminent crises that may well erupt in the region during its six-month term in the second half of 2022.
It is probable that the constitutional crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina will further intensify before or during the general elections scheduled for October, which could have destabilising effects on the wider region. The deadlocked dispute between Kosovo and Serbia will certainly remain an important latent source of regional instability, and any escalation will unavoidably have to be addressed at the EU level. The protracted domestic political crisis in Montenegro is another hot issue with wide-ranging implications for the region.
From the European perspective, it is questionable whether the bilateral dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia will be resolved anytime soon, nor whether the EU itself can even find internal agreement on the opening of accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia. If no progress is achieved during the French EU Presidency in that regard, the tough negotiations might be postponed to the Czech term.
All the above-listed burning regional issues, possibly amplified by other unexpected developments, will require a firm political response at the EU level to prevent further destabilisation of the Western Balkans. If it wants to meet the expectations already set for its EU Presidency mandate, Czech political representation will have to make full use of the limited room for manoeuvre and actively engage in regional politics, while preventing its internal divisions from interfering.
Correction: This is a corrected version of the article. In the original it said that Serbian President Vučić and then-prime minister Dačić came to Prague, but at the time Dačić was chairman of the National Assembly.